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AUDITORS IN MASSACHUSETTS AS ANTIDOTES
FOR DELAYED CIVIL COURTS *
iIVZAUICE ROSEN-BERG t AND ROBERT

H.

CHAN-IN I

Massachusetts' recent experience in using auditors to help roll
back trial delay in civil courts points up one of the toughest riddles in
the enigma of delayed justice, namely, how astonishingly hard it is to
tell whether a given delay "remedy" has worked or failed in practice.
To some extent the men who devise the remedies help deepen the riddle
of what happened by failing to provide in advance for the data that will
be needed to answer that question. Their understandable attitude is
that when a court is suffering from excessive delay in disposing of
backlogged cases, its concern must be radical improvement, not the
whys and wherefores or mechanics of the solution. They usually
adopt countermeasures in packages, not singly. Afterwards, if the
package as a whole has worked well, it is frustrating to try to learn
which measure did what.
By now it is almost trite to point out that physical scientists handling like problems of cause and effect would be careful to isolate their
hypothetical antidotes and test them one at a time under controlled
conditions. But courts and legislators that are faced with potential
breakdown in the administration of justice are not inclined to be cool
and clinical; and some even doubt their constitutional power to engage
in controlled experiments.1 The result is that they adopt crash programs, not researchers' ideals. The recent story in Massachusetts is
typical.
• This Article is the result of a study conducted by the Columbia University
Project for Effective Justice. The authors are grateful to Chief Justice Paul C.
Reardon of the Massachusetts Superior Court for his cooperation and interest in
connection with the work reported here. We acknowledge also the help of John A.
Daly, Executive Secretary of the Massachusetts courts; Edward J. Kelley, Executive
Clerk to Chief Justice Reardon; and Paul J. Marble, Assistant Clerk for Civil Business, Suffolk County Superior Court. Finally, appreciation is due to the members
of the Project's Advisory Committee for the direction and guidance which they have
supplied. The views expressed, however, are not necessarily those of the Committee
or particular members thereof.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. Director, Columbia University Project
for Effective Justice. A.B. 1940, Syracuse University; LL.B. 1947, Columbia University.
t Staff Attorney, Columbia University Project for Effective Justice. B.A. 1956,
Brooklyn College; LL.B. 1959, Yale University; M.A. 1961, Columbia University.
I A helpful discussion of the place of the controlled experiment in judicial administration appears in ZEisEL, KALvEN & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE CouRT 241-50
(1959) [hereinafter cited as DELAY IN THE COURT]. The Columbia Project is pres-

ently analyzing the results of an extensive, official-controlled test of the effectiveness
of the pretrial conference in the New Jersey civil courts. See remarks of Michael I.
Sovern, in Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice,60 COLum. L.
REv. 50, 83-86 (1960).
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BACKGROUND

In early 1956, with trial delay as high as 48 months in one
county,2 the Commonwealth adopted a many-faceted program to
quicken disposition of cases in its backlogged superior court.3 Included in the battery of procedures was a large-scale use of members of
the bar as "auditors" with authority to try cases referred to them by
the courts, subject to the litigants' option to insist on a retrial in court.
Within a year the superior court's delay problem dramatically improved and by 1959 had lost its crisis proportions.'
The auditor procedure has attracted interest outside Massachusetts
as a potentially useful corrective for court delay,5 both because it seems
promising in theory and because its sponsors report that it has worked
in practice. Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon of the Superior Court has
said: ".

.

. the auditors .

.

. have been of tremendous value in

breaking the backlog which existed in Massachusetts but a short time
ago. Too much cannot be said for their contribution." '
Despite this vigorous endorsement, no other state has chosen to
adopt the auditor procedure. In New York, California, and Illinois,
its adoption has at various times been specifically considered. 7 All
2

Worcester County. See MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF CIVIL JURY CASES SHOWING TIME LAPSE FROM DATE OF ENTRY To DATE
OF TRIAL; ORIGINAL ENTRIES AND REMlOVALS As OF JULY 1, 1959 IN THE SEVERAL
COUNTIES As AGAINST PRIOR YEARS [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON STATUS OF
CIVIL JURY CASES]. "Delay" as used throughout this Article refers to the period indicated in the preceding title and relates to "removed" cases, i.e., those transferred from
the district court to the superior court, rather than to "original entries."
3
This is the trial court of general civil and criminal jurisdiction. MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 212, §§ 4, 6 (1955). Trial delay in Massachusetts has generally been confined to the superior court. See 3 EXEC. SEC'Y ANN. REP. TO THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (1959) [hereinafter cited as ExEC. SEc'Y REPORT with the
appropriate volume number and year].
By July 1, 1955, delay in civil jury cases in the Superior Court of Massachusetts
exceeded two years from the date of entry to trial in 10 of 14 counties. See REPORT
ON STATUS OF CIVIL JURY CASES (1955). A Judicial Survey Commission, created in
1955, produced recommendations which became the basis of the court's 1956 program.
See text accompanying note 49 infra. See generally Reardon, Civil Docket Congestion
-A Massachusetts Answer, 39 B.U.L. REv. 297, 306 (1959).
4 By July 1, 1957, delay of two years or more existed in only two counties in the
state. REPORT ON STATUS OF CIVIL JURY CASES (1957). By late 1959 delay was one
year or less in all counties but one. 3 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT 5 (1959). In its July 1960
report, the Court Congestion Committee of the Boston Bar Association stated that
delay in the superior court has "almost ceased to be a problem." Boston B.J., July
1960, pp. 17-18. But see 4 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT 4 (1960).
5 See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL Comm. ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT
CONGESTION 20-22 (1959); Allesandroni, Arbitrators, Auditors, Referees, Pro-Tern
Judges, 328 Annals 116, 121 (1960) ; Harno, Our Courts and the Administration
of Justice, 49 ILL. B.J. 310, 314-15 (1961) ; Thorsness, The Use of Auditors to Cut
Court Congestion, 46 A.B.A.J. 179, 180-81 (1960) ; Yager, Justice Expedited-A Ten
Year Summary, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 57, 80 (1960).
6Reardon, supra note 3, at 310. See also 2 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT 6 (1958).
7New York has debated the merits of the auditor system many times. In 1934
the New York Commission on the Administration of Justice advocated its adoption.
COMIM'N ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE, REPORT 210
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three states have been troubled by chronic court delay, and have been
actively seeking remedial procedures.' Presumably their refusal to install the auditor system springs from doubt that it will unburden their
courts, or the conviction that even if it will, its costs and side effects
will be too undesirable to bear. The contrasting estimates about the
auditor system's effectiveness, costs, and values made it a timely subject for empirical study by the Columbia University Project for Effective Justice, which for several years has been analyzing and evaluating
various asserted remedies for delayed justice.' To be sure, not all the
pro and con arguments about the auditor procedure lend themselves
to empirical investigation. Many of them have nothing to do with
the efficiency of the procedure as a means of unburdening the courts,
but relate rather to asserted undesirable side effects of a "subjudiciary." For example, some complain that the auditor process
heralds the abandonment of traditional areas of judicial concern; 10
that it has an aura of "second-rate justice"; " that part-time auditors
lack the capacity of judges to get at the truth; 12 and that it results in
loose application of the rules of evidence."3
Then there are arguments that directly challenge the efficiency of
the process, such as that auditors eliminate only cases which would in
any event be disposed of without judge or jury action; 14 that the
number of cases reaching courtroom trial may even show an increase
(1934). But the New York Judicial Council rejected both an "emergency referee!'
bill, and then the auditor system itself, on the ground that a "sub-judiciary" was
undesirable in New York. 1 N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANN. REP. 47 (1935); 3 N.Y.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANN. RElP. 229 n.36 (1937). The New York Temporary Commission on the Courts in its 1957 report declared it was "not convinced that the worth of
. a Referee or Auditor System, running counter as it does to the usual concept
* .
of a right to trial by judge or jury, has been sufficiently demonstrated and does not
recommend its establishment." 4 TEMPORARY COMM'N ON THE COURTS REP. 47 (1957).
California and Illinois have enacted legislation permitting utilization at the litigant's volition of referees and commissioners. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 259(a), 638-45;
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 70141-48; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 90, §§ 51-56 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1960).
The voluntary character of these plans makes them akin to ordinary arbitration
procedures. This year the Illinois Judicial Advisory Council approved a bill patterned
on the Massachusetts plan, but it did not reach the floor of the legislature.
8 See, e.g., 4 N.Y. JUDICIAL. CONFERENCE ANN. REP. passim (1959); 18 CAL.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL BIENN. REP. 50-68 (1961); ILL. JUDICIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL,
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY 3-4 (1959).
9 Since its establishment the Project has combined legal and social science methods
in its researches.

Among published reports on its evaluations of delay remedies are

Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13
ARK. L. REv. 89 (1959); and Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory
Arbitration of Sinal Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REv. 448 (1961).
10 18 CAL. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 67 (1961).
11 Ibid.
12 Goldman, The Auditor System, A Study of CertainAspects, 27 BOSTON B. BULL.
133, 138-39 (1956).
13 NAT'L CONF. OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 25 (Vanderbilt ed. 1949). Goldman, supra note 12, at 137, 139.
14
DEAY IN THE COURT 216.
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as a result of auditor hearings; "5and that cases requiring retrial involve burdens that may offset any savings achieved by a preliminary
sifting of the facts at the auditor's hearing. 6 These arguments are
disputed by advocates of the auditor system."
Patently, a careful investigation of the facts can help settle some
of these arguments. This report will describe the auditor procedure,
will present new data on how it has functioned, and will analyze and
evaluate findings that throw light on its benefits and costs.

II.

THE SYSTEM IN OPERATION

In the modern version of the auditor system, some 80 lawyers
throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have been designated
by the court 18 to take testimony in civil actions, determine where the
truth lies, and make written findings of fact which they report to the
court.' 9 Unless there is special reason, an auditor must reside or have

his office in the county in which the case is pending.2" He is subject
to the usual disqualifications of a judge 2 and, in addition, may not
himself act as an attorney in a motor vehicle tort action so long as he
serves as an auditor.22 He receives nine dollars an hour for his time
in hearing the cases and preparing reports.3
15 Ibid.
16 Diamond, Congestion in the Superior Court Since Its Creation in 1859 and
Proposalsfor Relief, Mass. L.Q., June 1953, p. 115; Goldman, supra note 12, at 137-38
(1956).
17 Basically, the advocates urge that the system is a cheap, flexible, and expedi-

tious remedy for delay, since auditors can quickly dispose of cases, few of which will
require retrial in court. See Harno, Our Courts and the Administration of Justice,
49 ILL. B.J. 310, 314-15 (1961). They add that even if a case goes to trial, the
auditor's report will help reduce the time spent on trial because it presents sifted facts
and claims stripped of padding. See 3 N.Y. JUDICIAL CouNcnL ANN. REP. AND
STUDIES 229 (1937). To the same effect, see Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505, 512-15
(1877) ; Allen v. Hawks, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 359 (1831). Finally, the proponents
assert that reduction of delay can be accomplished with great saving of public funds,
because auditors are temporary officers, are paid considerably less than judges, and
do not require attendants or stenographers. See Falsgraf, Justice Delayed Is Injustice,
7 CLEV.-MAR. L. RBv. 118, 123-24 (1959); 3 N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, op. cit. mrpra
at 229.

18 Reardon, supra note 3, at 310. When the system was reinstituted in 1956, the
superior court solicited the bar associations for the names of those attorneys in each
county who, in the opinion of the county associations, would prove satisfactory in
handling cases on reference. The names of these attorneys were then screened by the
Committee on Procedures and forwarded to the justice presiding in each county.
Id. at 309.
19 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 221, § 56 (1955). See generally MOMA, MASSACHUSETTS PRAcTicE-CIvIL § 534-35, at 299-302 (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as
MOTTLA].
2

0 MASS. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 86.
Beauregard v. Dailey, 294 Mass. 315, 324-25, 1 N.E.2d 481, 486 (1936).

21

22 Superior Court, Notice to the Bar As to Auditors, Mass. L.Q., March 1956,
p. ix.
23

MAss. SUPER.

CT. (Civ.) R. 86.
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The use of auditors goes back to the reign of Henry III in the
13th century. 5 It was a complicated and unwieldly procedure employed solely in actions of account and was largely superseded when
the equitable bill of accounting developed.25 In Massachusetts auditors
were first authorized in 1817 by a statute which confined their functions
mainly to matters of account and examination of vouchers.26 In the
course of time, statutes and judicial decisions broadened the scope of
the auditors' powers until, under the statute as last amended in 1914,27
the superior court may in its discretion refer any action at law to an
auditor.2" While the parties may apply for a referral, in practice
nearly all are made on the court's initiative.29
A referral is "final," which is to say the auditor's findings of fact
become unimpeachable except for errors of law,3" only if the parties
consent; 31 almost always it is "nonfinal." 32 In either event, referral
is effected by an order or "rule" which fixes the time for the hearing
and tells the auditor what matters he is to hear and report. 33 At the
hearing the auditor's function is to receive competent proof under
34
courtroom rules of evidence and to pass on its credibility and weight.
24 See Locke v. Bennett, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 445, 446-47 (1851).
25 See LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 89-90 (2d ed. 1908).
26
SMass. Acts 1817, ch. 142 entitled, "An Act for Facilitating Trials in Civil
Causes. The statute was held not to violate the jury trial provisions of the state
constitution in Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505 (1877), with an interesting discussion
of the history of the process, on which see also Locke v. Bennett, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
445 (1851). Compare Allen v. Hawke, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 359 (1831). In Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-12 (1920), involving the federal constitution's guarantee
of trial by jury, the Massachusetts auditor plan was mentioned with approval.
27Compare MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 56 (1955), with Mass. Acts 1914, ch.
576, § 2.
Although use of auditors is con28 MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 221, § 56 (1955).

centrated in the superior court, the supreme judicial court, the probate court, and the

district court may also refer matters to auditors, the last only with the consent of the
parties. MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 221, § 56 (1955).
29 Between April 1956 and April 1960, approximately 95% of the referrals were
on the initiative of the court.
MOTOR

VEHICLE

CASES

REPORTS].
3
0MASS. SUPER. CT.

[1956-60] MASS.

REFERRED

TO

AUDITORS

CT. QUARTERLY
[hereinafter cited as

SUPER.

REPORTS OF
QUARTERLY

(Cw.) R. 89.

31 Merrimac Chem. Co. v. Moore, 279 Mass. 147, 151, 181 N.E. 219, 221 (1932).
3
2 Less than 3% of the referrals provide that the auditor's report of the facts

will be final.

[1956-60]

QUARTERLY REPORTS.

33 MASS. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 86-87. Findings on matters outside the order of
reference should be stricken or disregarded. See MOTTLA §§ 534-35, at 299-301;
Beauregard v. Dailey, 294 Mass. 315, 1 N.E.2d 481 (1936). If the order omits specification, the hearing is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings.
34 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 221, § 56 (1955); MOTrLA § 534, at 300. The parties
are required to be present at the hearing before the auditor, and if a party fails without
good cause to attend, the auditor may proceed ex parte, MASS. SUPER. CT. (CIv.) R.
87, or may close the hearing and recommend that judgment be entered for the adverse
party, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 58 (1932), Fratantonio v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 297
Mass. 21, 24, 8 N.E.2d 168, 169 (1937). Although the auditor does not have the
power to compel the presence or testimony of witnesses, and has no subpoena or
contempt powers, see Goldman, supra note 12, at 139 (1956), in practice a summons
is issued to a witness in the same manner as in a court proceeding and can be enforced
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He does not sit to decide questions of law, but perforce applies legal
principles in determining the issues.,' Following the hearing he makes
86
written findings of fact, in as general or specific form as he sees fit.
If any finding depends on a disputed question of law, he must either
make alternative findings of fact or state the view of the law upon
which his finding depends." He must also report rulings on objections
to the admissibility of evidence."8 Each party has a right to seek
revision of the report by asking the court to recommit it to the
auditor.3 9 In nonfinal referrals, the parties are not bound by the
auditor's findings and, on the insistence of one or both litigants, the
case will be retried in court.4" To obtain retrial before a jury, a demand must have been made before the auditor's hearing and reasserted within 10 days after filing of the report.4 1
At the retrial the auditor's report is admissible and becomes prima
facie evidence on the matters it properly embraces.42 This means that
the findings will be given evidentiary weight if opposed by other evidence and will be given conclusive effect if unopposed.4 3 Other
by application to a judge of the court. See Memorandum From Chief Justice Paul
C. Reardon to the Columbia University Project for Effective Justice, February 10,
1961, p. 5 (remarks on tentative draft of this Article) [hereinafter cited as Reardon
Memorandum].
-5 See Lunn & Sweet Co. v. Wolfman, 268 Mass. 345, 353, 167 N.E. 641, 645
(1929). The present statute recognizes this. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 56
(1955).
36 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Old Silver Beach, Inc., 303 Mass. 377, 378, 21 N.E.2d
956, 957 (1939); Treblas v. New York Life Ins. Co., 291 Mass. 138, 141-42, 196
N.E. 908, 909 (1935) ; Fair v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 112 Mass. 320, 329 (1873). After
the auditor closes the hearing he must within 30 days file a report on notice to the
parties. MASS. SuPR. CT. (Civ.) R. 87.
37 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 56 (1955).
38 Ibid.
Z9 See Lunn & Sweet Co. v. Wolfman, 268 Mass. 345, 349, 167 N.E. 641, 644
(1929); Newell v. Chesley, 122 Mass. 522, 525 (1877) (dictum). Granting of this
motion is discretionary with the court, and no appeal lies from its denial since an
aggrieved party has the opportunity to renew the objection at the retrial. See, e.g.,
Tobin v. Kells, 207 Mass. 304, 309-10, 93 N.E. 596, 597 (1911) ; J. W. Grady Co. v.
Herrick, 288 Mass. 304, 310, 192 N.E. 748, 750 (1934) (dictum). In the absence of
a motion to recommit, the trial judge may not consider objections to the report.
Smith v. Paquin, 325 Mass. 231, 235, 90 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (1950). He must, however,
exclude any finding of fact appearing to be based upon an erroneous view of the law
For a
or upon inadmissible evidence. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 56 (1955).
description of the somewhat different procedure for objecting to the report where the
findings are final, see MorrLA § 537.
4
OMASS. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 88. If the referral is final, neither party has a
right to a jury trial unless the order of reference is set aside. Hale v. Wheeler, 264
Mass. 592, 594, 163 N.E. 178 (1928). If it is not set aside, the auditor's report is in
effect a case stated. Kuzmeskus v. Pickup Motor Co., 330 Mass. 490, 492, 115 N.E.2d
461, 463 (1953). The court may reach a conclusion different from the auditor's, but
must do so upon facts stated in the report. See Keefe v. Johnson, 304 Mass. 572,
573, 24 N.E.2d 520, 521-22 (1939).
41
MASS. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 88.
42
The auditor's report may be offered
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 56 (1955).
by either party or by the court on its own initiative. See Clark v. Fletcher, 83 Mass.
(1 Allen) 53, 56 (1861).
43 See text accompanying note 121 infra.
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evidence may come in on issues previously reserved by one of the
parties, or by leave of court,' which in practice is freely given.
The auditor system is not considered a permanent part of the
judicial establishment in Massachusetts, but an emergency procedure
to cope with overburdened dockets in the superior court, to be invoked
as and when the need arises. 5 Widely utilized in motor vehicle tort
cases from 1935 to 1942, it fell into virtual disuse when World War II
rationing curbed automobile accidents.4 Its renewal on April 2, 1956,
was designed to deal with an engulfing volume of motor vehicle tort
47
cases which were again clogging the dockets of the superior court,
but its use has spread to other types of law actions.48 At the same
time Massachusetts adopted other procedural measures to achieve relief
from court delay. Among these were a rule limiting the number of
continuances because of an attorney's engagement elsewhere, extended
use of district court judges in the superior court, creation of a nontriable docket for long-inactive cases, and intensified use of pretrial
procedures.4 9 In 1958 came an increase in the number of judges in
the superior court and a provision for transfer of undersized cases to
the district court.5 ° The cumulative effect of these other changes was
undoubtedly beneficial and complemented whatever contribution the
auditor program made to easing the delay problem.
III. SCOPE OF TIls STUDY

Ideally, to evaluate the contribution of the auditor procedure, one
should study enough data to be able to gauge the effect of each of the
44

SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 88.
See 1 ExEc. SEC'Y REPORT 9 (1957) ; Reardon, supra note 3, at 308-09. Some
counties have passed the point of need and refer but few cases to auditors. Id. at 310.
46 Large scale reference of motor vehicle tort cases to auditors was begun in
Essex County in 1932, discontinued in 1933 and restored in 1935. See 3 N.Y. JUDICIAL
MASS.

45

For a statistical analysis of the
COUNCIL ANN. REP. & STUDIES 229 n.38 (1937).
1932-33 experience, see Com' N ON THE ADmINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT 210-18

(1934).
From 1935 to 1942, 46,986 cases, about 24% of the civil law cases filed, were
referred to auditors. See Reardon, supra note 3, at 309; 30 MASS. JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Referrals were discontinued after November 1, 1942, see
ANN. REP. liD (1954).
19 MASS. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANN. REP. 49n. (1943), and until the institution of the
present system early in 1956 their number was de ininimis.
47 See 1 ExEc. SEC'y REPORT 8-9 (1957).
In the four years following the reinstitution of the system on April 2, 1956, 19,089 cases were referred to auditors. [195660] QUARTERLY REPORTS. This represents 15% of all civil filings in approximately the
same 4-year period. 1-4 ExEC. SEC'Y REPORT (1957-60) (chart on Civil Business
Statistics of the Supreme Court). Compare note 46 supra.
48While most counties apparently still refer motor vehicle tort cases almost
exclusively, a spot check discloses that other types are also referred.
49 See Reardon, supra note 3, at 306-08.
50 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 212, § 1 (Supp. 1960) (number of superior court
associate justices increased from 31 to 37) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 102c (Supp.
1960) (court on own motion may transfer tort and contract actions to district court
where no reasonable likelihood that plaintiff will recover $1,000).
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other delay antidotes adopted contemporaneously in Massachusetts.
But that task would be enormous, and perhaps even impossible because
of the dearth of necessary data. For similar reasons it proved undesirable to try to study the auditor procedure itself in every county
of Massachusetts, or even in several of them. Suffolk County, as the
major metropolitan area of Massachusetts, with thirty to forty per cent
of the state's civil litigation, seemed a profitable locus for the study.5
Even thus limited, the job required costly and concentrated effort.
At the start of the renewed use of auditors in 1956, trial delay in
the Superior Court of Suffolk County had reached 32 months.52 At
first the court referred only motor vehicle tort cases to auditors, but
since early 1957 it has also been referring other types of law actions.53
In this report it will therefore be possible to analyze the impact of the
auditor system on the general run of law cases.' The time focus is
the four-year period following the reinstitution of the system (April
2, 1956, to March 31, 1960). At the end of this period, delay was
about 12 months.55 During the four years roughly one in every eight
civil actions filed, some 5,479 cases, were referred to the approximately
eighteen auditors who have been serving in Suffolk County.5 6 By the
cutoff date, 3,544 of the referred cases had been finally disposed of
and 1,537 had been fully processed by the auditors but were awaiting
possible court action; " the remaining 398 were still pending before
auditors.5 8
51 Suffolk County (Boston) has 15% of the Commonwealth's population of about
5,000,000. In 1959, of the 32,245 civil actions commenced in the superior court throughout the state, 10,893 or 34% were in Suffolk County. 3 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT 64-65
(1959). In 1958 the figure was 34%, 2 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT 69 (1958), and in 1957,
35%, 1 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT 87 (1957).
(Suffolk County).
52 See REPORT ON STATUS OF CIvIL JURY CASES (1955)
53 See [April-June 1957]
QUARTERLY

REPORTS;

QUARTERLY

REPORT

(Suffolk

County);

[1958-1960]

Interview With Edward J. Kelley, Executive Clerk to Chief

Justice Reardon, in Boston, February 27, 1958.
54 Cases classified as "land takings" and "all others," comprising only about 5%
of the filings, see, e.g., 32 MASS. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANN. REP. 86 (1956), are
excluded, since they are very rarely referred to auditors. Unless otherwise indicated,
totals appearing below in this Article do not include these classes of cases.
55 See 4 ExEc. SEC'Y REPORT 4-5 (1960).
56 The number of filings of civil law cases in the four years beginning July 1,
1956 was 44,640: 10,910 in 1957; 11,734 in 1958; 10,893 in 1959; and 11,103 in 1960.
See 1-4 EXEC. SEc'Y REPORT (1957-1960) (chart on Civil Business Statistics of the
Superior Court). There is no reason to believe that the total of filings in the four-year
survey period was significantly different. The 5,479 cases referred to auditors in the
period (excluding 234 later vacated referrals) constitute 12.3% of the total filed.
57 These presumably include cases in which the parties were satisfied with the
report but had not obtained a final court judgment upon it; cases in which one or
both of the parties had requested further relief, either by a motion for recommittal to
the auditor or for judgment on the report, or by a demand for a court retrial; and
cases in which an appeal was pending from some action of the trial court. See
generally MorrLA § 537.
58 [January-March 1960] QUARTERLY REPORT.
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Much of the data reported here was drawn from existing court
records, with the indispensable cooperation of Chief Justice Reardon
and his staff. Special research was done to fill gaps when regularly
kept records were inadequate. During the preparation of this report
the authors consulted closely with the Massachusetts court authorities
to obtain their insights concerning the day-to-day operation of the
system. Necessarily, however, the approach, analytical techniques,
findings, and evaluations set out here are the authors' own and should
not be understood as carrying the imprimatur of the Massachusetts
authorities. Indeed, Chief Justice Reardon himself disputes at least
one of this study's main premises, to be discussed below. 9
While the paramount stress of this report is on analyzing the
effect of the auditor system in reducing court delay, the authors in no
sense suggest that this is the sole value to be served in the administration of justice. True, deflecting thousands of cases from the courts
to the auditors may speed trial for the cases that remain, but what of
the effects of the process on the deflected cases? The report will give
attention to that subject, and to certain other aspects of the system,
including its cost, to which the data speak.
Finally, there will be a comparison of the effects of the Massachusetts procedure with those of the Pennsylvania plan for compulsory
arbitration of small cases, which has features in common with the
auditor system.60 Both systems attempt to deflect cases from the court
by referring them to an out-of-court tribunal and placing certain
impediments in the way of their return, while allowing them to return
if either party insists. In addition, both systems are manned by practicing attorneys. The arbitration plan differs in the following basic
respects: it is confined to small cases; it recruits many thousands of
lawyers on a volunteer basis for very limited service on three-man
panels; on a retrial the arbitrators' findings are not known by the
court or the jury; and it employs a monetary deterrent against "appeal" by requiring the party who appeals to repay the arbitrators' fees.
IV. THE EFFECT ON CouRT DELAY:
BALANCING THE JUDICIAL SUPPLY-DEMAND EQUATION

In simplest terms, the problem of court delay can be viewed as
reflecting an imbalance in the judicial supply-demand equation.

Delay

occurs when the demand made by a group of cases for courtroom
processing exceeds the supply of court resources, namely, judge time
59 See note 62 infra, and accompanying text.

0 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 30 (Supp. 1960); Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial
by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Sinall Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L.

Rzv. 448 (1961).
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available to process them. To deal effectively with this imbalance, a
remedy must restore equilibrium by altering at least one side of the
equation. The primary goal of the Massachusetts system is to cut
down the demand for judge time by permanently deflecting large
numbers of cases from the courts. 61 A secondary object presumably is
to assure that if some cases do return to court they will require only
brief trials and hence little judge time.
Whether the system in fact achieves these results depends upon
whether the referred cases would have demanded substantial judge time
if they had remained in the courts and whether the auditor process
effectively reduces that demand. Obtaining fairly precise answers to
those questions is more complicated than might at first appear. It
would not do simply to determine how many cases were removed from
the court's lists by referral, for not all cases made equal demands on
court time and the referred cases might have been above or below
average in their potential demands. Moreover, some of the referred
cases later returned to the court for retrial. The first job was to learn
how many potential trials there were in the referred group and then
to subtract from that figure the number of actual retrialsthey produced.
The remainder would represent the net saving in trials. The second
job was to translate the potential trials and the actual trials into their
respective equivalents in judicial time and then to subtract the latter's
time demands from the former's. The remainder would be one element
in the amount of time the auditors spared the judges.
A. Amount of Trial Time Auditors Spare the Court
The emphasis upon eliminating trial work for the courts is a
deliberate one.62 It rests on the assumption that activities related to
trials account for the major part of the time-and-energy output of the
court. Although the Suffolk court 6 3 does not keep records allowing a

conclusive test of the assumption, it seems well warranted on the
evidence from other states.
61 Although some look upon auditors as auxiliary judges who augment the supply

of judicial power available to the court, see

DELAY IN THE COURT

216, it seems more

appropriate to view the auditor system as reducing the work demands made by the
cases. A true increase in the supply of judge power results when lawyers ascend
the bench, even if only temporarily, and supplant regular judges by taking over some
or all of their functions. Cf. id. at 217.
62 Chief Justice Reardon has questioned the correctness of this emphasis, his view
being that "the great saving to the Superior Court does not lie at all along the avenue
indicated by the[se] computation[s] . . . [but] is resident rather in the fact that
hundreds and thousands of cases never reached a jury or jury-waived session at all
simply because they collapsed when or shortly after the parties were led to a hearing
room." Reardon Memorandum 2; see text accompanying note 107 infra.
63 As used in this Article, the term "Suffolk court" means the Superior Court
of Massachusetts, Suffolk County.

19611

MASSACHUSETTS AUDITORS

Studies in the New York Supreme Court show that although only
a minor part of that court's caseload requires trial, these cases absorb
Much less
far the major part of the court's total judge time."
judge time is spent on remaining tasks such as pretrial conferences,
motions, and administrative duties.
In New Jersey, a Project analysis of a large random sample of
"timesheets" filed by superior court judges in the period September
1959 to September 1960 discloses that trial and trial-related activities
consume approximately 61%, of the judges' total time. 5 This figure
is probably lower than in similar courts in other states, since New
Jersey's so-called "assignment" judges devote an unusually large
amount of their time to administration and other nontrial work. 6
That this situation holds true in the Massachusetts courtsnamely, that durable cases, requiring trials for their disposition, make
the heaviest demand on the judges' time-appears prima facie from the
way judges are deployed to the various "sessions" of the superior
court. On any given court day in the survey period in Suffolk County
there were between 12 and 15 judges sitting in civil cases.6" Of these,
one judge was assigned year-round to the motions session and another
judge for ten months to the pretrial session, where he also handled
the assignment of cases. 6s All other judges were assigned to trial
sessions. 69
64 Although less than 30% of the cases which reach the calendar of the New York
County Supreme Court actually go to trial, they consume approximately 84% of the
court's total judge time. DELAY IN THE COURT 38-39. See also Rosenberg and Sovern,
Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 1115,
1124-25
(1959).
65
The remaining 39% is distributed as follows: 13% to motions; 11% to pretrials; 10% to settlement conferences; 5% to calendar management and assignment.
The New Jersey judges for several years have been required to file "timesheets"
showing time they spend on various aspects of case processing. See DELAY IN THE
COURT 186-87 & n.3. The figures presented in the text were derived from an analysis
of a large random sample of these sheets filed by the 15 superior court judges who
devoted their time primarily to civil law cases.
66 When these judges are omitted from the computations, we find that the remaining judges devote approximately 72% of their time to actual trial work. In the federal
district courts a recent study reveals that approximately 59% of the judge time spent
in processing private civil cases is absorbed by trial and trial-related activities.
[1956] DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP.
180, 6191.
7
Letter From Thomas Dorgan, Clerk for Civil Business, Suffolk County Superior
Court, to Project for Effective Justice, April 17, 1961. The justices of the Massachusetts Superior Court are not permanently assigned to a single county, but are
utilized wherever needed. MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 212, § 2 (1955). The 1958 increase
in the number of superior court justices apparently did not change the number generally6 assigned to Suffolk County.
8 Letter From Thomas Dorgan, Clerk for Civil Business, Suffolk County Superior Court, to Project for Effective Justice, April 17, 1961.
69 Letter From Edward J. Kelley, Executive Clerk to Chief Justice Reardon, to
Paul J. Marble, April 10, 1961, on file with the Project for Effective Justice. In
1957 and 1958 there were usually three district court judges sitting on civil cases on
the Suffolk court, one assigned to pretrials in motor vehicle tort cases, the other
two, to trial sessions. Letter From Thomas Dorgan, Clerk for Civil Business, Suffolk
County Superior Court, to Project for Effective Justice, April 17, 1961.
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It thus appears that 83-87%. of the judge power in the Suffolk
court was assigned to trial work and the balance-13-17% of the
total-was assigned to other aspects of processing the cases. While the
mere fact that a judge is assigned to a trial session does not guarantee
that he spends all his working time on trial activities, informal reports
from Massachusetts court personnel suggest that he does so spend the
bulk of his time."° The New Jersey data tend to support this estimate.
In that state, a superior court judge who is engaged in the equivalent
of a Massachusetts trial session spends three-fourths1 or possibly more
of his time in trials and closely related activities.7
If it is accepted that trial tasks absorb the greater part of the
supply of judge time available to the court, it becomes plain that to be
effective the auditor process will have to reduce those tasks in the referred cases either by cutting down on the number of courtroom hearings or curtailing the time taken by retrials, or both. While it will
also be relevant to see what effect the auditor process has in reducing
nontrial demands on the court's time, the efficiency of the system will
be very directly proportional to its tendency to avoid trial work for
the judges. To determine whether the system has achieved a saving
in this respect, the starting point is the question: How many auditorheard cases were spared courtroom trials which otherwise would
probably have been necessary? To obtain this figure required projecting known data to get (a) the percentage of referred cases which
hypothetically would have reached trial,"2 and (b) the percentage which
actually entered the courtroom for retrial. After determining the
excess of (a) over (b) it was possible to compute the number of trials
spared the court.
To estimate the number of referred cases that would have
reached trial during the survey period had there been no auditor procedure, the first step was to derive the percentage of civil dispositions
which reached trial in 1 9 5 6 ,7a the year before restoration of audi70 Letter From Edward J. Kelley, Executive Clerk to Chief Justice Reardon, to
Paul J. Marble, April 10, 1961, on file with the Project for Effective Justice.
71 The equivalence is very rough, since division of judicial labor in New Jersey
is by different means than in Massachusetts. In general, New Jersey superior
court judges devote Mondays through Thursdays primarily to trial work and
reserve Fridays for motion and pretrial work. To enhance comparability, analysis

was confined to timesheets covering only the first four weekdays. If anything, New
Jersey's 75%-25% division of labor between trial and nontrial work on MondayThursday is probably lower on the trial side than for Massachusetts judges assigned
to trial sessions, because of the large amount of administrative work done in New

Jersey. When the administrative judges' timesheets are omitted, the trial figure for

Monday to Thursday work rises to 84%. See note 65 vtpra and accompanying text.
72 Hereinafter, to "reach trial" means, in a jury case, to impanel the jurors; in
a nonjury case, to open the trial.
73 Throughout this Article, except where the context otherwise indicates, mention
of a named year refers to the 12 calendar months from July 1 of the preceding year

to June 30 of the named year; thus, judicial year 1956 runs from July 1, 1955 to June
30, 1956.
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tors.7 4 In that year the Suffolk court disposed of 9,063 "filed" civil
cases " of which 1,087, or 12%, reached trial. 76 Next, assuming that
the 12% trial rate would have persisted through the survey period, we
applied it to the number of referred cases finally disposed of by the
auditors during that period, namely, 3,544, after an adjustment to
make the latter figure comparable to the 9,063 base figure from which
the 12%o trial rate was derived. This was necessary because the referred cases were taken from a "pretrial list," " whereas the base figure
included all cases filed, whether or not they reached the pretrial list.
After the adjustment, it turned out that of the 3,544 referred cases the
auditors disposed of, approximately 495 would have reached trial.7"
We then subtracted from 495 (the "(a)" figure in the formula)
the estimated number of auditor-heard cases that returned to the court
for retrial (the "(b)" figure). This number we computed as 400, 7'
74 Although 471 cases were referred to auditors in the last three months of 1956,
[April-June 1956] QUARTERLY REPORT, it is highly unlikely that these references
could have any effect upon the percentages reported in the text
75The total number of civil law cases disposed of was actually 9,576. However,
513 cases involved "land takings" and "all others," which, unless otherwise indicated,
are excluded from computations in this article. See note 54 supra; 32 MAss. JuDIcLL
CouNcm REP. 95 (1956).
76 This figure is derived by subtracting from the 1,200 trials of all types of cases
in 1956, 32 MASS. JUDICAL COUNCIL REP. 89 (1956), the 113 "land takings" and "all
others" which were tried to completion. Id. at 88. Since these are almost exclusively
nonjury cases, they rarely close short of complete trial, and failure to deduct those
that settle during trial is, accordingly, not a significant omission.
77
MAss. SUPER. CT. (Civ.) R. 58-59. It follows that the referred cases are, as
a group, older than the cases "filed" and hence more durable, on the principle that
the older a group of cases, the higher the percentage that will reach trial. See
generally Rosenberg and Sovern, .supranote 64. Even if, as has been reported, some
cases have been referred without first appearing on the pretrial list, they were of comparable age and thus the same considerations would apply.
78 Several steps were needed to derive this figure. First was the task of bringing
the referral total into line with the "filed" total. Using 1958 statistics, we found that
13,069 cases were disposed of by the court, but that only 11,470 had gotten as far as
the pretrial list (from which the auditor group was referred). The difference shows
an attrition from filing to referral of 14%. Hence, the 3,544 cases in the auditor
group equal 86% of a larger group of filings, namely, 4,121 cases. Next, applying the
12%o trial rate to that figure yields 495.
A basic assumption throughout these computations is that the referred cases comprise a representative cross section of the cases filed, both as to type of action and
durability (trial-reaching potential). With regard to type, representativeness seems
assured by the fact that cases are referred without regard to the nature of the action.
A breakdown of a 310-case sample, see note 79 infra, shows a close correlation to
the types of cases filed in 1957, the year the sample cases entered court Further,
the sample shows 57% motor vehicle tort actions and 1956 filings show 62%, a fairly
close figure. With regard to durability, there would be no reason to suppose that
discretionary referral results in any deliberate skewing in either direction, except
for Chief Justice Reardon's comments, which suggest that the judges have a tendency
to keep the "quality" cases (those requiring trial) in the courts and to refer cases
which are more likely to be settled. Reardon Memorandum 2. If this were a consistent practice, it would result in reducing the auditors' potential as court time savers.
79 11.3% of 3,544. No records are kept as to the total number of referred cases
which return to the court for retrial. The only retrial figure officially reported in
the QUARTERLY REPORTS is the number of cases which return to the court and are
completely retried. Moreover, even these latter figures show many internal inconsistencies and appear on their face to be inaccurate. Accordingly, in cooperation
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meaning that there was a net saving of (495 minus 400 =) 95 trials
in the survey period, which equals 2.7% of the auditors' dispositions.
By the end of the survey period the auditors had achieved an
additional but "unrealized" saving of trial energy, and this saving must
also be credited. As of March 31, 1960, the auditors had concluded
their work in some 1,537 cases which had not been formally disposed
of because a request for trial or other court relief was still pending."
Applying to that figure the net rate at which auditors spare courtroom
trials (2.7%o), one finds an "unrealized" saving of 41 trials. Adding
these to the 95 trials already mentioned, we conclude that when all
the cases sent to auditors in the 4-year survey period are finally disposed of, the court will have been spared a total of 136 trials, or 34
a year. 8 ' This represents 3%, of the civil cases the superior court tries
annually; and translated directly into judge time, about one-third of
a judge-year.8 2
with the Suffolk court's personnel, a survey was undertaken to determine what happened to referred cases. Beginning with the entries on July 1, 1957, the clerk noted
the first 310 references to auditors appearing on the civil law docket and followed
them through to final disposition. Although 47 had not been closed, most of these
had been transferred to the nontriable docket and were probably destined to fade
away. However, to give the auditor procedure the benefit of the doubt, we regarded
all unaccounted-for cases as dead, so far as retrial possibilities were concerned. It
was found that 35, or 11.3% of the cases were retried after the auditor hearing. The
accuracy of this figure is supported by a similar analysis of cases referred to auditors
in Norfolk County during the first half of 1957. Of the 217 cases finally disposed of
at the date of the sampling, 28, or 12.9%, had returned for retrial. Memorandum
From the Clerk of the Norfolk County Superior Court to Chief Justice Reardon,
October 21, 1960, on file with the Project for Effective Justice. A further check
comes from an analysis of the Suffolk County trial record books for calendar year
1960. See note 116 infra and accompanying text. In that year 102 auditor-heard cases
returned to the court for retrial. Since these cases were not referred during any
particular year, it is not possible to derive a precise trial rate. However, it is at
least suggestive that in each of the survey years the number of dispositions was
about 900 cases, which would place the trial-reaching figure at about 11%.
80 These 1,537 cases and the 3,544 final dispositions total 5,081, some 398 less
than the 5,479 cases that were referred to auditors in the survey period. The difference
is due to the fact that 398 of the referred cases were still pending before auditors as
of March 31, 1960. See note 58 .upra and accompanying text.
81 This is not meant to suggest that the amount of trial saving was equally distributed in each of the survey years.
82 For each of the judicial years 1956-1959, the court's annual trial load, including
"land takings" and "all others," remained at approximately 1,200 cases. Tables
Received From the Clerk of the Suffolk County Superior Court (unpublished). The
34 trials spared by auditors represent 2.8% of this figure. Since at least 11 judges
are assigned to the civil trial sessions in Suffolk County at any one time, it follows
that the part of the trial load of which each can dispose is approximately 9%. A
saving of 3% would be the equivalent of ij of a judge's energies. This probably
overstates the amount of saving, since each judge not only handles tried cases, but
also helps process cases which do not reach trial. Conceivably, the prospect of an
auditor hearing could cause cases to be settled prior to actual referral, and such
cases would not appear in the figures reported above. Chief Justice Reardon implies
this happened by noting that the number of annual dispositions increased from about
9,000 in 1956 to 13,000 in the years 1957-1959. Reardon Memorandum 1-2. Even
if this increase were due primarily to the auditor system, it probably did not represent
much saving of judge time since presumably cases which are settled before referral
would not, if left alone, have persisted to a courtroom trial. Beyond that, there is
reason to doubt that the auditor system was primarily responsible for the increase.
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Thus far the estimates and projections have assumed that all cases
which reach trial make the same demands as all others upon the court's
time. That assumption must now be checked against the possibility
that postauditor trials on the average run abnormally longer or shorter
than they would have if there had been no auditor hearings. Three
variables are involved, each having a tendency to make the time which
is required for retrial of a case different from the time it would have
taken to try it originally in a courtroom: (i) the amount of evidence
presented; (ii) waiver of jury; and (iii) compromise during the course
of the trial. All three factors reflect the possible influences of the
auditor's hearing: his findings of fact will have prima facie effect at the
retrial, and with his findings before them the litigants may change their
settlement offers and their views as to how much evidence to introduce
at the retrial and whether to waive a jury.
1. How Much Proof at Retrial
It has been suggested that in some cases the presence of the
auditors' findings might serve to condense the proof at retrial compared with the amount which would be offered in a regular courtroom
trial. Chief Justice Reardon has declared: "It is fair to state that the
average retrial, where the auditor finds for the plaintiff, is much
briefer than it would have been had the case been tried initially before
the Court." ' In such cases, his comment runs, it is "not unusual on
retrial for the plaintiff to read the auditor's report and then rest, further evidence from him being by way of rebuttal only." 84 Conversely,
if the auditor favored the defendant there "is usually a complete retrial
with the plaintiff putting in his entire case anew." s5
Those observations make it important to know whether the party
seeking a retrial is usually a plaintiff or a defendant. Available evidence is that in at least 63%. of the retrials, it was the plaintiff who
insisted on a courtroom hearing, for the auditor had found for the
defendant in that percentage of the cases which were retried. 6 In the
remaining 37% of the cases, the plaintiff probably did not always put
In 1960, with the auditor program still in effect, dispositions dropped to approximately 10,000 cases, not far above the 9,000-odd cases disposed of in preauditor 1956.
In 1960 auditors accounted for about 1,000 dispositions. A possible explanation for
the drop in total court dispositions in 1960 is that, for the first time since 1956, no
use was made of district judges. 4 ExEc. SEC'Y REPORT 3 (1960).
83
Reardon Memorandum 4.
84

Ibid.

85 Ibid.

80 This finding is derived from analysis of all cases in calendar year 1960 that

were retried after an auditor's hearing.
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in only a pro forma case based upon the auditor's findings." It would
thus appear that reduction in proof can seldom be counted on at retrials and that no substantial timesaving for the court will result from
abbreviation of evidence.
2. Jury or Nonjury Retrials
Observers uniformly agree that trial before a jury consumes
more time than would a jury-waived trial of the same case. 88 To
save time, postauditor retrials should show less affinity for juries
than do regular trials. But the evidence is that a higher percentage
of retrials require juries than do cases that are tried without
having been heard by auditors. Of the estimated 400 retrials conducted during the survey period, 83% required juries, 9 contrasted
with a 76% rate for cases that were tried initially in the courtroom."
It is conceivable that these figures merely reflect a statistical coincidence-that jury-prone cases are more likely to seek retrial than
jury-waived cases-but there is no evidence for this supposition. Certainly an auditor hearing does not strongly induce jury waivers,
since in only 17 retrials in 100 was a jury waived. One is left to
conclude that the auditor process does not save court time by converting potential jury trials into shorter nonjury retrials.
3. Complete or Incomplete Trials
It is self-evident that trials that go all the way to verdict or award
consume more judge time than would partial or incomplete trials in
similar cases. It follows that another possible way for the auditor
system to reduce the time judges spend in retrials would be by pro87

It seems apparent that in at least some of them, the plaintiff sought a retrial
because of dissatisfaction with the amount of the award. And some satisfied plaintiffs
may, for one reason or another, have preferred to present their cases in full. In
addition, even if, as Chief Justice Reardon suggests, the plaintiff does rely upon the
auditor's report for his case on direct, with further evidence being by way of rebuttal,
see text accompanying notes 83-85 supra, the effect would seem to be that the parties
present their evidence in a different order, but not necessarily in a lesser amount.
88 See DELAY IN COURT 78-79 & n.7 (jury trials two to two and one-half times
as long as nonjury trials in similar cases); LEViN & WooLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY:

A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL
trials 40%-60% shorter).

ADmINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 90

(1961)

(nonjury

89 Of the 35 retrials contained in the 310-case sample, see note 79 supra, 29 were
before a jury. This high jury demand rate is confirmed by the analysis of referrals
in Norfolk County. Of the 28 retried in that sample, 26, or 939, were retried to
a jury. Memorandum From the Clerk of Norfolk County Superior Court, supra
note 79.
90 Of the 1,087 cases that reached trial in 1956, 828 were tried to a jury. 32

RP. 89 (1956). The jury figure is derived from the total
of 839 jury trials for all types of cases by a computation similar to that in note 76
MASS. JUDIcIAL COUNCIL

s.pra.
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moting compromises short of verdict in the retried cases. Such
compromises might result from a closing of the gap between the
opposed parties' expectations in the light of the auditor's findings.
There is no evidence that this happens. In fact, in the 400 retrials
which took place during the survey period, an abnormally high percentage went all the way to verdict or award instead of ending in a
settlement part way through the trial. Specifically, it turned out that
the retried cases went to completion 86% of the time, 9' as against a
71% completion rate in cases that were never heard by an auditor.9"
Here again there is no evidence to suggest that the abnormal rate of
completions is the product of self-selection. That is, there is no evidence that if there had not been auditor hearings in these cases an
even higher percentage of the retrials would have gone all the way to
a verdict. The percentage of completed trials, as against during-trial
compromises, in the retried cases is so close to 100% that any
tendency that might exist for an auditor hearing to promote settlements during retrial must be minimal.
Taking this evidence as a whole, we conclude that postauditor
retrials consume no less court time than a like number of ordinary
cases that go directly into a trial courtroom. The chart on page 44,
summarizing the figures discussed above, shows on a projection basis
the effects of the auditor process upon the burdens of the court in
connection with retrials.
The striking feature of the chart is the apparent effect of an
auditor hearing to step up both the percentage of jury trials and the
percentage of complete trials. 3 With regard to the former tendency,
it may be that the losing party before the auditor is convinced that a
jury will be more likely to overturn the auditor's findings than a judge
would be. As for the high complete-trial rate, it may be that the party
who prevailed before the auditor becomes much less willing to compromise than during regular trial, with the result that most cases go all
the way to a decision.
91 Thirty of the 35 retrials in the 310-case sample went to completion. In the
Norfolk County sample all 28 retrials went to completion. Memorandum From the
Clerk of Norfolk County Superior Court, supra note 79.
92 Of 1,087 cases that reached trial, 775 were tried to completion. 32 MASS.
JUDIcIAL CouxcI REP. 89 (1956). See note 76 supra.
93 The effect of the auditor system on the trial load can be expressed somewhat
differently. The following table estimates the number and type of trials spared the
Suffolk court by the use of auditors in the survey period:

Jury Trials
Nonjury Trials

Partial

Complete

Trials
115 fewer
7 fewer

Trials
50 more
64 fewer

122 fewer

14 fewer

65 fewer
71 fewer
(Total = 136 fewer)

44

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll0:27

CHART
EFFECT

OF

AUDITOR PROCESSING ON PERCENTAGES OF CASES
REQUIRING JURY AND COMPLETE TIALS
COMPLETE TRIALS REQUIRED:

JURY TRIALS REQUIRED:

I

When No
Auditor

On
Retrial

'

When No
Auditor

80

-

On
Retrial

i

70-

60 -

i
B. Amount of Other Than Trial Time Auditors Spared the Court
In addition to its impact on the court's trial load, the auditor
program has achieved a further saving by aborting large numbers of
pretrial conferences." A projection of the 1956 experience " indicates
that in ordinary course 74% of the 5,479 cases referred to auditors in
the survey period would have required pretrials. 6 They did not do so
94 Pretrial conferences in the superior court are held at the discretion of the judge.
R. 58. See generally Reardon, Civil Docket Congestion

See MASS. SUPER. CT. (C'v.)

-A MassachusettsAnswer, 39 B.U.L. REv. 297, 312 (1959). Of course, cases referred
to auditors from the pretrial list are not actually pretried.
95 The projection of the 1956 percentage assumes that the referred cases comprise a random sample of the cases filed. See note 78 supra.
96 Of the 5,012 cases on the pretrial list in Suffolk County in 1956, 3,703, or
74%, were actually pretried. The remainder were settled, nonsuited, defaulted, or
continued.

32 MAss. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REP. 102 (1956).
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after having been referred, with a consequent avoidance of 4,054
pretrials, or about 1,000 each year. The extent of this saving can be
gauged from the fact that one judge normally conducts 1,500-2,000
pretrial conferences a year.17 This amounts, then, to a saving of
about Y to % of one judge's annual energies.
We are satisfied that there were not any other significant savings.
While the detouring of the 5,479 referred cases avoided various interlocutory applications and motions in those cases, the total judge time
thereby saved was doubtless de minimis. In the first place, a single
judge handles the motion business for the entire court 9" and the
referred cases comprised an average of only 13% of the total case load
in the survey period.9 9 Secondly, even that figure does not represent a
net saving, since cases were not referred until the pretrial list was
made up,""0 and they probably produced motion activity before they
reached that list. Moreover, some of the referred cases certainly produce special motions, such as those to recommit unsatisfactory findings.Y'
Finally, those cases which returned to the court for retrial
after an auditor's hearing had to be placed on the trial list by motion,
thus absorbing court time at that stage."0 2

C. Alternative Formula to Compute Auditors' Saving of Court Time
A simpler formula than that used above yields a less precise but
useful estimate of the auditors' contribution to unburdening the court.
In essence this technique is to compare the number of cases disposed
of by the auditors in the survey period with the number disposed of
by a specific complement of Suffolk court judges in a known period
of time. Then the work product of the auditors is translated into its
equivalent in judge time.
In the last year before restoration of the auditor procedure, the
court had at most 15 judges and disposed of approximately 9,600 civil
97 The superior court justice assigned to the pretrial session in 1957 conducted
2,036 pretrials; in 1958, 1,807; in 1959, 1,411. Summary of Work in Pretrial Sessions,
Prepared By the Clerk of the Suffolk County Superior Court, on file with the Project
for Effective Justice. Similarly, in 1957 the district court judges who conducted
the pretrials in motor vehicle tort cases held on the average 1,800 per year. Ibid.
98Note 68 supra and accompanying text.
99 See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
100 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
101 See note 57 =upra.
102 See MAss. SuPRm. CT. (Civ.)

R 88; MomA § 537.

46

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll0:27

cases of all types including 1,200 by trial."° In the 4-year survey
period the auditors disposed of about 5,100 cases. If we assume for
the moment that cases which went to auditors were roughly comparable
in their potential demands on judge time to the 9,600 regular cases
disposed of in 1956, we can readily compute the gross saving achieved
by the auditors:
X (the judge-years spared by the auditors' work)
15 (the number of judges who manned the court in 1956)
5,100 (the number of cases disposed of by auditors)
9,600 (the number of cases disposed of by the court in 1956)
Solving the equation, we find that during the survey period
the auditors disposed of 53% of the work done by 15 judges in a year,
thus achieving a gross saving of 8 years of judge time. An upward
adjustment of that figure is necessary because the 5,100 auditor dispositions are not strictly comparable to the 9,600 court dispositions.
The difference is that the court's figure is made up of all cases that
were filed, whereas the auditors' figure includes only those filed cases
that survived to the point of referral. We know that before filed cases
reach this point they undergo a certain amount of attrition or dropout.
To adjust for this factor required increasing the 5,100 figure to the
number of filings that produced it, to wit, 5,930.1°4 Using that figure
in the equation set out above, the recomputed gross saving in judge
time that resulted from the auditors' work was 9.3 years.
The 9.3 figure overstates the judge time saved by the auditors'
work because some of the cases they processed nevertheless made demands on the court's time. This happened either prior to their referral or after their return. There is reason to assume that the auditor
group of cases made demands on the court's time roughly in proportion
to their number; and that the total amount of these demands can be
estimated by using the 400 retrials they produced as a base. The retrials during the survey period amounted to 4094200 or % of the trial
dispositions by the court with its 15-judge complement in 1956, or
5 judge years. This formula possibly exaggerates the demands by the
auditor group, since unlike the court disposition group, they were
completely outside the courts from the point of referral until their
return on motion to recommit or for retrial. They therefore did not
103 These figures are slightly larger than those reported previously, see text
accompanying notes 75-76 supra, since they include "land takings" and "all others."
104 Approximately 14% of the cases close between filing and compilation of the
pretrial list. See note 78 supra.
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require the pretrial conferences which would have occurred during that
period, at a maximum cost of 2.7 judge years. 0 5 Decreasing the 5
judge years which the auditor cases would have demanded by 2.7 years
results in net demand of the auditor group of 2.3 years. Subtracting this from the gross saving, 9.3 years, yields a net figure of
7 years as the approximate amount of court time spared by the
auditors.
Recapitulating, we have arrived by two different paths at estimates
of the amount of court time spared by auditors during the survey
period. By the first and more detailed route, the saving amounts to
3 to 4 judge years. By the more general route, the estimate rises to
7 judge years. We are confident that these two figures reliably bracket
the area of the auditors' contribution.
It seems quite clear that these estimates do not significantly
understate the auditors' contribution, for if none of the auditorprocessed cases had made any demands whatsoever for court attention,
they would have spared the court about 60% of its 1956 load, or the
work of 9 judges.0 6 This is a conservative assumption, for Chief
Justice Reardon has offered his view that as a result of the referrals
to auditors, "the court was left to try cases on a docket of ever
increasing quality while matters never destined to a jury trial were
disposed of quickly" by the auditors. 0 7 For us, this says that the
auditor group of cases would on the average have been less demanding
of court time than those that remained in the court. Of necessity, one
would therefore expect that the auditor group saved somewhat less
than the 9 judge years their sheer volume would suggest. The calculations in this report indicate that the lesser figure would be on the
order of 4 to 7 judge years.
V. THE AUDITOR-PROCESSED CASES
However important the effect of the procedure upon the dispatch
of business in the superior court, it is well to keep in mind that its
most direct impact has been upon the referred cases subjected to
auditor hearings. The evidence is strong that for them the process
has meant speed in disposition, convenience, and efficiency. All three
results are apparently hallmarks of out-of-court processing of civil liti105 Since the annual saving as a result of aborting pretrials was between 1/ and
of a judge year, see text accompanying note 97 .upra, the maximum saving for

the entire survey period is 2.7 judge years.
106 5,930 (the adjusted number of cases disposed of by auditors) - 9,600 (the
number of cases disposed of by the court in 1956) = 61.7%, which we have rounded
to the 60% figure reported in the text.
10
7Reardon Memorandum 2.
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gation, as attested, for example, by similar reports from Pennsylvania
on the compulsory arbitration procedure in action.'
So far as concerns the time interval between referral and reaching
the auditor's hearing room, there is no doubt that there was a speedup.
In the last preauditor year civil cases in the Suffolk court had to wait
32 months from the date they were "entered" until they were regularly tried.'
Under the auditor procedure no referred case has had
to wait more than 12 months for a hearing, and most were reached
within only a few months."0 Meanwhile, trial delay in the Suffolk
court fell sharply, and by the end of the 1959 court year was normally
less than a year."'
Not only have referred cases waited less time to reach a hearing
room, but lawyers, litigants, and witnesses have experienced less
wasted time once their case was reached." 2 This apparently results
from the practice of scheduling the auditor hearing for a convenient
time and place and proceeding with it promptly at the appointed hour.
Most observers report that the hearing itself is considerably shorter
than a trial because of its informality and the absence of a jury, yet
there are some complaints that auditor hearings drag."'
It is fair to conclude that the consensus in Massachusetts is that
the auditor process is an agreeable one from the standpoint of the cases
and persons subjected to it. Of course, in the instances when the case
must go through a retrial in court after it has passed through an
auditor hearing, there is probably less zeal for the arrangement, but as
has been seen, retrials occur in only a minor fraction of the cases.
There remains to consider the interesting and important question
of whether many cases reach a different outcome before auditors than
they would before juries. Frequent reversals or modifications in those
cases that go from an auditor's hearing to a jury's verdict might point
to an affirmative answer. Since it is highly undesirable that mere
change in the adjudicative method bring about altered outcomes in the
108 See Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of S-mall
Claints in Pennsylvania, 74 HARv. L. REv. 448, 455 & n.42 (1961) (collecting sources
on this point).
109 See REPORT ON STATUS OF CIVIL JURY CASES (1956); note 52 supra and
accompanying text.
110 Interview With Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon, Edward J. Kelley, Executive
Clerk to Chief Justice Reardon, and John Daly, Executive Secretary of the Massachusetts courts, in Boston, October 31, 1960.
111

See

REPORT OF STATUS OF CIVIL JURY CASES

(1959).

11 Reardon Memorandum 2.
113 See Goldman, The Auditor System, A Study of Certain Aspects, 27 BoSTox
B. Bum. 133, 137 (1956).
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referred cases," 4 numerous jury-auditor disagreements in retried cases
might point to a serious defect in the process. 1 5
To determine whether auditors and juries reach different conclusions in the cases exposed to both, we examined the 82 cases which
were retried to completion in calendar year 1960.116 A comparison
of the juries' verdicts " 7 and the auditors' findings shows a marked
rate of disagreement in deciding the two basic issues, liability and
damages. The jury confirmed the auditor in 59% of the cases and
reversed or modified on one or the other issue in 41% of the cases.
There is no evidence that jury-auditor disagreements were more
frequent on one basic issue than another. As to liability, juries reversed the auditor in 22% of the retried cases. As to damages, the
inquiry must be confined to cases in which both the auditor and jury
found for the plaintiff, since whenever either found for the defendant
there were not discrepant damage awards to compare. In the 27
cases in which both awarded the plaintiff damages, the jury modified
59%, of them." 8 In round terms, the auditor and jury disagreed on the
liability issue as often as they disagreed on the damage award." 9
As to which party benefits from the jury's disagreement, the
analysis discloses that the jury was more favorable to the plaintiff on
the liability question, but tended to reduce his damages. Thus, of 18
cases in which there was disagreement on liability, plaintiffs had won
only 5 before the auditors, but emerged with 13 jury verdicts. In the
16 cases wherein both found for the plaintiff but differed as to the
amount of the damages, the jury reduced the amount in 10 cases and
raised it in 6.
114 See DELAY IN THE COURT xxii-xxiii; LEvIN & WooLEY, op. cit. supra note 88,
at 20-25; Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After"
Survey, 13 ARE. L. Rav. 89, 108 (1959). But see LaBrum, Congested Trial Calendars:
It's About Time to Do Something About Them, 43 A.B.A.J. 311, 314 (1957); Ryan
& Greene, Pedestrianism:A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.AJ. 117, 121 (1956).
1G A like objection applies to procedures which seek to reduce delay by inducing
waiver of juries in regular trials. Questionnaire surveys by the Jury Project of the
University of Chicago Law School disclose that in jury-tried cases the judge presiding disagreed with the verdict on liability in 21% of the cases and that the judges'
damage awards would have averaged about 20% less than the juries allowed. Zeisel,
The Jury and Court Delay, 328 Annals 46, 48 (1960).
116An additional 20 cases that returned to the court for retrial during this
period were settled during trial, resulting in a trial completion rate of approximately
80%. Compare note 91 supra.
117 The terms "jury" and "verdict" are used throughout because the vast majority
of retrials were before juries.
118 An auditor's damage award was deemed "modified" if the jury's verdict increased or decreased the award by at least 10%. In the cases involving such modifications, the smallest was a 17% diminution by the jury of the auditor's award, and
the largest was a 133% increase.

119 There was disagreement as to liability in 18 cases compared with disagreement

as to amount in 16.
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The following table shows in detail the variations in auditors'
findings and court adjudications in retried cases:
TABLE
C0oPARISON

OF

AUDITORS' FINDINGS AND COURT ADJUDICATIONS IN RETRIE

CASES

Extent of Agreement on Liability and Damages (82 cases)
Agree on liability and damages ...............
Both for defendant .......................
Both for plaintiff for same amount ........

No.
48
37
11

Percentage*
59%°

Disagree on liability and/or damages .........

34

41%

82

100%

Total

.......................

Extent of Agreement on Liability (82 cases)
No.
Agree on liability ............................
Both for plaintiff .........................
Both for defendant .......................
Disagree on liability ..........................
Auditor for plaintiff ......................
Court for plaintiff ........................

Total ........................

Percentage*

t

78%

82

100%

Extent of Agreement on Damages Where Both for Plaintiff (27 cases)
Agree on amount of damages ..................
Disagree on amount of damages ...............
Auditor for more .........................
Court for more ...........................
Total .......................

No.
11
16
10
6

Percentage*
41%
59%
37%
22%

27

100%

* Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number by dropping decimals less than .5 and raising the others.

These figures must be interpreted in the light of the fact that the
auditor's findings are read to the jury and are then given the added
weight of prima facie correctness. This is in direct contrast to the
Pennsylvania arbitration system, under which the jury does not know
of the arbitrators' award, let alone accords it prima facie validity. 20
Translated into trial court instructions, the Massachusetts provision
for prima facie effect signifies that in the absence of contrary evidence,
the jury is bound to accept the auditor's fact findings but is not bound
to derive the same inferences therefrom, and that if there is contrary
120 See note 60 supra and following text.

1961]

MASSACHUSETTS AUDITORS

evidence, the fact findings are entitled to evidentiary weight but are
not conclusive. 12 '
Obviously, no one can divine the precise impact of the court's
instruction and the knowledge regarding the auditor's decision upon
the jurors' verdict in any particular case. But it seems indisputable
that the auditor's findings will carry some persuasive force with the
jury-and this is the apparent premise and intention of the Massachusetts process. However the jury may react in any particular case,
what overall conclusions can be drawn by reference to the results of the
82 retrials discussed above?
As to the cases that went through retrial, the figures speak for
themselves: There was a reversal or modification of the auditor's decision in 2 out of 5 of these cases, and one-fourth more plaintiffs emerged
with jury verdicts than emerged with auditor awards. 22 But the
figures in and of themselves do not prove that all auditors' determinations would undergo the same rate of revision if all were retried before
juries, because the 82 retrials analyzed here may be unrepresentative
of the unreviewed auditors' awards. It may be that the lawyers who
insisted on retrial did a sensitive job of selecting the cases most likely
to result differently when taken to a jury; or conversely, they perhaps
predicted very badly and failed to seek retrial in many cases that would
The possibility that the 82 retrials
have been reversed or modified.'
are a skewed sample of the auditors' product precludes the inference
that they accurately reflect the extent of disagreement between all
auditor-heard cases and their potential results if tried before the
court. 4
21
1
See Cook v. Farm Serv. Stores, Inc., 301 Mass. 564, 566-67, 17 N.E.2d 890,
892-93 (1938); MOTTLA § 540, at 312. In Salter v. Leventhal, 337 Mass. 679, 151
N.E.2d 275 (1958), the following instruction by the trial judge was approved: "And
so, both parties have availed themselves of the right to introduce other evidence which
may tend to support or to contradict or control this auditor's report. . . You take
all the facts and circumstances in the case, you take all the evidence you have heard,
and you include the auditor's report as evidence, and arrive at your own verdict on
this controversy." Id. at 697, 151 N.E.2d at 285.
122 Plaintiffs received 32 awards from the auditors as compared with 40 verdicts
from the juries.
3= It is Chief Justice Reardon's view that the self-selection is of the first type:
"The cases retried are those where one or both parties are dissatisfied by the auditor's
findings to the point of essaying a retrial. It follows that the possibility of an upset
of the auditor's findings is greater in such cases than in the average case." Reardon
Memorandum 5.
124 Comparison of the results reached on the liability issue in all cases tried to
completion in the Suffolk court in 1956 (both jury and nonjury) with a sampling
of auditors' reports during the survey period discloses rather substantial variations.
Of the court adjudications, 52% were for the plaintiff; of 142 auditors' reports taken
at random, 64% were for the plaintiff. The former figure is in line with the statistics
commonly encountered in courts of general jurisdiction elsewhere. For example, a
study of a large sample of motor vehicle personal injury cases tried to completion
in the California Superior Court reveals that 52.6% were decided for the plaintiff.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REsEARcn INsTITUTE, MOTOR VEHICLE PERSONAL INJURY
CAsEs IN THE CoURTs, Table V (1961). Similarly, in the Chicago Jury Project, see
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Further insights can perhaps be drawn from the figures by comparing them with the results of a somewhat similar analysis in Pennsylvania. As earlier noted, in that state's compulsory arbitration
system either party has a right to seek court trial after the mandatory
arbitration, provided he reimburses the county for the arbitrators'
fees.12 5 In a Project study of the operation of this procedure in the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia, it developed that in trespass (tort)
actions juries had reversed arbitrators' awards on the liability issue in
38% of the "appealed" cases."2
There are too many significant differences in the Pennsylvania
process-the size of the cases subjected to it, and the motivations,
penalties, and rewards regarding appeals-to permit deriving reliable
conclusions from the higher reversal rate experienced there. But it is
nevertheless interesting to recall that in Pennsylvania, unlike Massachusetts, the jury functions in ignorance of the prior tribunal's award
and, of course, does not receive the prima facie instruction from the
trial judge. An intriguing speculation is to what extent these variations may be reflected in the difference between the 38% and 22%
reversal rates.
Another noteworthy variance in the results of the Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania procedures relates to the matter of which side wins.
Opposite patterns of decision appear in the two systems. As compared to the juries which heard the same cases on retrial, the Massachusetts auditors tended to favor defendants on the liability issue; whereas
in Pennsylvania the arbitrators were distinctly less likely to find for
defendants than the jurors were." 7 We have not been able to account
for this deviation.
VI. WHAT THE AUDITOR SYSTEM COSTS

To spare the court a part of its work by the auditor procedure
takes labor and money. As to the labor, the major burden of the
note 115 supra, New York juries decided 55% of the cases for the plaintiff. See also
Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics
of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 38 (1961). This suggests that
in the run of cases auditors may be somewhat more favorable to plaintiffs on the
liability question than the courtroom triers of fact, but it is in no sense conclusive
since there was no way to establish the statistical comparability of the groups of
cases that were sampled. With respect to the amount of damages awarded to plaintiffs,
court adjudications ran higher than auditors' awards in the two samples, exceeding
$3,000 26% of the time, whereas the auditors' awards were above that mark only
18% of the time. Here, too, the figures cannot be taken as definitive because of the
possible noncomparability of the two samples.
125 See text following note 60 supra.
126 Rosenberg & Schubin, supra note 108, at 465.
-27 Of the 45 trespass cases in which there was both an arbitration report and a
jury verdict, defendants had won only 11 arbitration awards but emerged with 22
verdicts. Ibid.
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process is borne by members of the bar. By March 31, 1960, the 18
auditors in Suffolk County had spent approximately 8,350 days hearing referred cases, preparing reports, and doing related activities.M
This presumably represents nearly one-half of their available working
time." 9 As has already appeared, the result of this effort was to spare
the court an estimated total of 136 trials and about one-fourth of its
pretrial conference work. This works out to an investment of approximately 61 days of auditors' time for each avoided courtroom trial, but
that figure must be adjusted to give credit for the pretrial saving.
Moreover, according to most reports, the referred cases have been disposed of in a quick and convenient manner, and this represents an
additional credit against the expense in auditor time.
There is little doubt that the actual burden on the bar is far less
than the bare figures would suggest. Most of the 18 Suffolk County
auditors have served in this capacity since the restoration of the system
in 1956.11' Typically they are lawyers who have had long, active
careers and who, it is said, rather welcome the opportunity of auditor
service to retire from the grind of active practice without losing touch
with their profession.' 31
Relevant to the question of labor cost is the time burden on the attorneys who function as trial counsel in the auditor procedure. Each
must attend the hearing itself and must prepare for it. In addition he
usually prepares "Requests for Findings of Fact" and "Requests for
Rules of Law." 3 2 Often his presence is necessary at a hearing on the
settlement of the auditor's proposed report; 13 and there may be opposition to the report, motions to recommit it for additional findings, or
motions to strike out portions of the report. 34 Finally, in every 9th
case referred to an auditor, the adversary lawyers, parties, and witnesses bear the inconvenience of a retrial of the same issues.
128 This figure is derived as follows. In the survey period, Suffolk County spent
$376,415 for auditors' fees. This figure, divided by $9, the hourly rate of pay, gives
41,824 hours of auditor-time. On the basis of a five-hour court day, 8,365 days of
auditor-time were expended during the survey period, which has been rounded to
the figure reported in the text.
129We estimate from the above figures that each auditor spent approximately
464 days in processing these cases during the four-year survey period, or about 116
days each year. Since the "working year" is in the neighborhood of 225 to 250 days,
this represents about one half of ordinarily available working time.
130 Interview With Chief justice Paul C. Reardon, Edward J. Kelley, Executive
Clerk to Chief justice Reardon, and John Daly, Executive Secreary of the Massachusetts courts, in Boston, October 31, 1960. Indeed, several of the auditors served
in a similar capacity during the 1935-1942 period.
131 Interview With Chief Justice Paul C. Reardon, Edward J. Kelley, Executive
Clerk to Chief Justice Reardon, and John Daly, Executive Secretary of the Massachusetts courts, in Boston, October 31, 1960; see Reardon Memorandum 4.
132 See MoTrLA § 535, at 301-02.
133 MAss. SUPER. Cr. (CIv.) R. 88.
13 See MoTmA § 536.

54

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.110:27

So far as financial debits go, the auditor system cost Suffolk
County $376,415 in the 4-year survey period, 13 5 an average of $74 per
referred case.' 36 Figures are not available to determine whether the
auditor system resulted in a "net" financial saving or loss to the
county. To make the comparison, it would be necessary to compute
the saving to the taxpayers of the 136 avoided trials and the 4,000
37
avoided pretrial conferences.'
VII.

FINDINGS AND TEACHINGS

In the wake of Massachusetts' enactment in early 1956 of a battery
of procedures intended to reduce serious trial delay in its superior
court, there was marked improvement. The auditor procedure was
one of the chief remedial measures adopted. This study has attempted
by means of a survey in Suffolk County covering the years 1956 to
1960 to determine to what extent the auditor system contributed to
the improvement. In addition, the authors have examined the impact
of the auditor process on cases that experienced it, and have estimated
its cost in auditors' time and public funds. The following were some
of the findings:
(1) Both in Suffolk County and in the Commonwealth as
a whole, trial delay in the superior court dropped sharply after
1956.
(2) After 1956 the Suffolk court experienced a substantial
step-up in its volume of annual dispositions, namely, from about
Meanwhile, auditors were dis9,000 to 13,000 in each year.'3
posing of about 1,200 cases in each year.
(3) Auditors played a role in the reduction of delay in the
Suffolk court by sparing the court between 4 and 7 years of judge
time by eliminating about 136 trials and 4,000 pretrial conferences
that probably otherwise would have been necessary.
15 [1956-60] QuARTERLY RErPORTS. This figure is the amount of money paid to
auditors in fees.
136 This average was obtained by dividing the total amount spent by the total
number of cases referred to the auditors, less the 398 cases still pending before them
for which bills have not yet been submitted.
137 To do this would require knowledge of the specific number of trial and pretrial days saved the court, how many of them were in jury as against nonjury cases,
and the cost of each of these items. Unfortunately, our research did not uncover
information which would permit us to make this computation. Approximately 35
years ago the cost of a jury trial was estimated at $500 a day; the estimate has
risen to $650-$750 a day. See Reardon, Civil Docket Congestion-A Massachusetts
Answer, 39 B.U.L. REv. 297, 302-03 (1959).
13 8 But in 1960 dispositions dropped to approximately 10,000 cases. Note 82
supra. See also text accompanying note 140 infra.
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(4) The vast majority of cases referred to auditors experienced little delay in reaching hearing and, according to most
reports, enjoyed more convenient and shorter hearings than if
they had gone through courtroom trials.
(5) Of the auditor-heard cases, an estimated 574 required
retrials in the courtroom,' 39 with the auditors' reports serving as
prima facie evidence. In a substantial proportion of the retrials
(41%) the trier of fact-usually a jury---disagreed with the
auditor on the liability or damage issue. The rate of reversal
on the liability issue is markedly lower than in the somewhat
analogous Pennsylvania procedure which differs from the auditor
plan in not informing the jury of the prior findings.
(6) In Suffolk County 18 auditors spent about 8,350 days
on the cases they processed, at a cost to the county of $376,415.
From these and various of the subsidiary findings appearing
earlier certain conclusions flow with regard to the auditors' contributions and costs. At an apparent direct expense to the public of
about $90,000 a year, they reduced the Suffolk court's business burden
by the equivalent in work of 1 to 2 judges for each of the 4 years
surveyed. In a court with a complement of 15 judges, this works out
to an increase of about 7-13%, in judge power.
While the direct costs of the auditor system, about $90,000 a
year, are not strikingly low when set against the judges' work spared,
sponsors of the system rightly point out that auditors do not have to
be continued in office beyond the emergency period as judges would
doubtless be if new judgeships had been created at equivalent cost.
It seems to us that the auditors were a factor of limited importance
in causing the dramatic drop in trial delay experienced by the Suffolk
court beginning in 1957. Without detailed studies of the impact of
each of the other remedies concurrently introduced, it would be idle
to attempt a definitive estimate of the relative contribution of any particular measure. However, there is some evidence that the use of
district court judges helped significantly, inasmuch as when their use
was discontinued, there was a sharp drop in the number of dispositions.1 4 ° Since auditors disposed of only about 1,200 cases a year,
they made only a partial contribution to the 4,000-case increase in the
court's dispositions.
139 This figure includes the estimated 400 cases which were actually retried dur-

ing the survey period, and the estimated 174 cases which will have been retried when
the remaining 1,537 referred cases, see notes 79, 80 .spra and accompanying text, are
finally disposed of.
140

See note 82 supra.
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One factor limiting the effectiveness of the auditors as judge timesavers stands out in the contrast between the 4,000 pretrial conferences
they spared the court, and the 136 trials they saved. Since trials make
the major demands upon judicial time, for maximum effect a remedy
must curtail the trial burden. The evidence is that in actual practice
the auditors did not do this, either by reducing the number or the
length of the potential court trials.
Reaction from the bench and bar to the effect of the auditor system
on the cases it processes is by and large very favorable from the standpoints of dispatch in reaching a hearing and convenience at the hearing.
But the figures on jury-auditor disagreement in retried cases suggest
that in a significant percentage of cases the auditors' determinations
may have been different from those that would have been rendered by
juries. The major difference is that juries are more favorable to plaintiffs than auditors on the liability issue. It is not known whether the
auditor-processed cases that were not retried would produce rates and
types of disagreement similar to those shown by the retried cases.
There are morals in this study with regard to method and technique and these have substantial meaning. Despite long and earnest
attempts by the staff of the Columbia Project for Effective Justice,
there are gaps in the study. These cannot. be closed, either because
needed data cannot be retrieved or reconstructed or because the absence of controls obscures the answers to various important questions.
An example is the intriguing matter of whether differences result in
auditor dispositions compared with those which would have been
reached in court trials of the same cases. Lack of data on that subject
is particularly regrettable, for if anything is clear it is that, whatever
the efficiency of a procedural device in the administration of justice,
it should not be adopted unless it leaves the results of litigation substantially intact; or unless, if it changes the results, the extent and
manner of the changes are known and acceptable as a price to pay for
added efficiency. For the answer to difficult questions of that kind, the
need is for better judicial statistics and for bolder administration of
new procedures, with built-in controls that permit reliable evaluation.

